CVE-2026-86836
HighCVSS 8.4Summary
In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.2, the agent creates workload files and Control Interface FIFOs under a predictable path derived from the agent name and a hash of the workload configuration. If the path already exists at agent startup, it is reused without validating owner or permissions, allowing a local user to impersonate the workload and modify cluster state.
Risk Assessment
A local unprivileged user with write access to the base directory (e.g. shared /tmp) can hijack a workload's Control Interface and, depending on configured permissions, read or modify the cluster's desired state.
Recommendation
Upgrade Eclipse Ankaios beyond version 1.0.2, and until then restrict write access to $TMPDIR/ankaios and verify permissions of existing FIFO paths.
Other vulnerabilities in Eclipse Ankaios
See all- CVE-2026-85201Medium
In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.1, the agent does not limit the length declared by a workload in a length-delimited protobuf message received through the Control Interface FIFO. A workload with Control Interface access can specify an excessive message length, causing unbounded memory allocation that may abort the agent process, resulting in loss of orchestration services.
- CVE-2026-84173High
In Eclipse Ankaios versions v0.5.1 through v1.0.1, the agent-side Control Interface authorizer incorrectly evaluates multi-segment allow rules whose first path segment is a wildcard. An authenticated workload with restricted access can submit a CompleteStateRequest or UpdateStateRequest with an empty field mask, which may be incorrectly authorized, allowing read of the complete cluster state or modification outside its authorized subtree.
Original NVD description (English source)
In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.2, the agent creates workload files and Control Interface named pipes (FIFOs) under a predictable path derived from the agent name and a hash of the workload's runtime configuration. If a directory or FIFO already exists at that path when the agent (re)starts, the agent reuses it based only on an existence and/or file-type check, without validating its owner or permissions. A local, unprivileged user with write access to the same base directory (by default under `$TMPDIR/ankaios`, e.g. shared `/tmp`) can pre-create this path hierarchy, including the two Control Interface FIFOs, before the agent starts. The agent then treats the attacker-owned FIFOs as the legitimate Control Interface for the targeted workload. The attacker can complete the Control Interface handshake and issue requests using that workload's configured `controlInterfaceAccess` permissions, allowing impersonation of the workload and, depending on its configured permissions, unauthorized reading and/or modification of the cluster's desired state.