CVE-2026-86671
HighCVSS 8.4Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk15th percentile - higher than 15% of all known CVEs
Summary
In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET `/api/scm/resolve` and POST `/api/factory/resolver` endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to `URLFetcher.fetch()`, which calls `new URL(url).openConnection()` with no scheme or host allow-list and returns the response body to the caller. Any authenticated Che user can read arbitrary local files via the file:// scheme (including the pod's Kubernetes service-account token at `file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), reach internal HTTP services and cloud instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and have their stored SCM personal access token attached as an `Authorization` header to a host of their choosing. The same credential-forwarding behavior also fires when a victim opens a workspace from a malicious devfile whose `parent.uri` points to an attacker-controlled server, enabling exfiltration of the victim's SCM PAT without direct API access. No fix is available.
Risk Assessment
The vulnerability allows an authenticated user to read sensitive files, access internal resources, and steal access tokens, potentially leading to full compromise of the Che environment and associated systems.
Recommendation
Restrict access to the vulnerable endpoints, monitor user activity, and consider temporary mitigations such as network filters until an official patch is released.
Other vulnerabilities in Eclipse Che
Original NVD description (English source)
In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET `/api/scm/resolve` and `POST /api/factory/resolver` endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to `URLFetcher.fetch()`, which calls `new URL(url).openConnection()` with no scheme or host allow-list and returns the response body to the caller. Any authenticated Che user can read arbitrary local files via the file:// scheme (including the pod's Kubernetes service-account token at `file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), reach internal HTTP services and cloud instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and have their stored SCM personal access token attached as an `Authorization` header to a host of their choosing. The same credential-forwarding behavior also fires when a victim opens a workspace from a malicious devfile whose `parent.uri` points to an attacker-controlled server, enabling exfiltration of the victim's SCM PAT without direct API access. No fix is available.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

