CVE-2026-85668
HighCVSS 7.5Summary
Xinference (affected commit 4a94832, v3.x) contains an unauthenticated arbitrary-path file read vulnerability in the POST /v1/models/llm/auto-register endpoint, which accepts a caller-supplied model_path parameter without authentication or path confinement. The endpoint reads and parses config.json, tokenizer_config.json, and chat_template.jinja files at the supplied path and reflects the parsed content back to the caller, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to probe the server filesystem and extract content of files with those names in any directory.
Risk Assessment
The risk includes unauthorized reading of sensitive configuration files and potential disclosure of system data.
Recommendation
Require authentication for the auto-register endpoint and restrict the model_path parameter to allowed directories.
Other vulnerabilities in Xinference
See all- CVE-2026-61539Critical
Xinference is an inference API for running open-source, speech, and multimodal models. In 2.5.0 and earlier, Xinference passes attacker-influenced Llama3 tool-call output to eval() in xinference/model/llm/tool_parsers/llama3_tool_parser.py and xinference/model/llm/utils.py. Requests to /v1/chat/completions with a tools field flow through xinference/api/restful_api.py, xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py, handle_chat_result_non_streaming(), and _post_process_completion() before extract_tool_calls() or _eval_llama3_chat_arguments() evaluates the model-generated Python expression. An unauthenticated remote attacker can influence that output through a crafted prompt and execute commands in the Xinference server process context. This issue is fixed in version 2.7.0.
- CVE-2026-76841High
Xinference enables remote code execution by default when loading Hugging Face models, and before version 2.12.0 there is no setting to disable it. An attacker with model launch access can execute arbitrary code.
Original NVD description (English source)
Xinference (affected commit 4a94832, v3.x) contains an unauthenticated arbitrary-path file read vulnerability in the POST /v1/models/llm/auto-register endpoint, which accepts a caller-supplied model_path parameter without authentication or path confinement. The endpoint reads and parses config.json, tokenizer_config.json, and chat_template.jinja files at the supplied path and reflects the parsed content back to the caller, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to probe the server filesystem and extract content of files with those names in any directory.