CVE-2026-82426
MediumCVSS 6.5Summary
A vulnerability in Apache Storm allows an authenticated user with topology submission rights to specify any server-side path as the topology jar, bypassing the intended file upload flow. Nimbus opens the path without verifying it was uploaded, enabling access to files readable by the Nimbus daemon user.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can access sensitive data such as the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, TLS private keys, or ZooKeeper credentials. Possession of the Nimbus keytab can escalate privileges to cluster administrator, posing a critical risk to the entire environment.
Recommendation
Upgrade Apache Storm to version 3.1.0 or later, where the submitted path is canonicalized and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict topology submission to trusted principals via `nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and rotate the Kerberos keytab, TLS keys, and ZooKeeper credentials.
Other vulnerabilities in Apache Storm
See all- CVE-2026-82433Medium
In Apache Storm before 3.1.0, the getNimbusConf function returns full configuration without redaction, and the UI endpoint /api/v1/cluster/configuration lacks proper authorization, potentially exposing passwords and keys.
- CVE-2026-82432High
In Apache Storm before 3.1.0, the rebalance operation does not revalidate the blobstore map for permissions, and listBlobs lacks authorization checks, allowing an authorized user to access disallowed blobs and disclose metadata.
- CVE-2026-82428High
This vulnerability in Apache Storm affects the `storm jar --artifacts` feature, where dependency artifacts are stored under a blob key derived solely from the Maven coordinate, making it predictable and shared across all users. If the blob already exists, it is silently reused without owner verification, allowing an attacker to control the data that other submitters receive, leading to code execution in another tenant's topology.
- CVE-2026-82427High
A vulnerability in Apache Storm allows an attacker to use relative path segments (../) in the `topology.blobstore.map` to force deletion and symlink creation at arbitrary locations, acting as the supervisor user. This can lead to recursive deletion of data and replacement of symlinks, which when workers are launched enables execution of attacker-chosen code as another tenant's OS user, breaking isolation.
- CVE-2026-84179Medium
Vulnerability in Apache Storm allows unauthorized users to read credential data (e.g., storm.zookeeper.auth.payload, keystore/truststore passwords) via the topology API, because Nimbus daemon configuration is merged with topology configuration and returned without redaction.
- CVE-2014-0115High
Directory traversal vulnerability in the log viewer in Apache Storm 0.9.0.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter to log.
- CVE-2026-82435Critical
In Apache Storm before 3.1.0, a vulnerability exists: the Netty decoder is installed before authentication and processes frames without verification, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to allocate large buffers and potentially cause memory pressure on workers.
- CVE-2026-82439Critical
The DRPC server in Apache Storm keeps a map from function names to request queues, and entries are never removed. An attacker can send arbitrary function names without authentication (as `drpc.authorizer` is disabled by default), leading to unbounded memory growth and eventual heap exhaustion.
- CVE-2015-3188Critical
The UI daemon in Apache Storm 0.10.0 before 0.10.0-beta1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Original NVD description (English source)
Description Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator. In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via `nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected. Credit Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept. Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.