CVE-2026-81735
CriticalCVSS 10.0Summary
In the mcp-http-server package of UI-TARS-desktop, startServer.ts defaulted the listen address to '::' (all interfaces), and authentication middleware was optional. The commands and filesystem servers exposed tools without requiring credentials, allowing unauthenticated clients to run arbitrary commands or read/write files. The listen default changed to 127.0.0.1 in commit c2ad42e3eb9b27830db41a3e6f51ca7179d9b168; package version remained 1.2.4.
Risk Assessment
An unauthenticated attacker on the network can execute arbitrary commands on the server or read/write files, leading to full system compromise.
Recommendation
Apply commit c2ad42e3eb9b27830db41a3e6f51ca7179d9b168 or later, which defaults listening to 127.0.0.1, and configure required authentication.
Original NVD description (English source)
startServer.ts in the mcp-http-server package of UI-TARS-desktop defaulted its listen address to '::' when no host was given, so startSseAndStreamableHttpMcpServer bound the Streamable HTTP and SSE MCP transports to every interface, and its authentication middleware was optional: middlewares are applied only when a caller supplies them. The @agent-infra/mcp-server-commands and @agent-infra/mcp-server-filesystem entry points call startSseAndStreamableHttpMcpServer with a host and port alone and pass no middleware, so neither server required a credential. The commands server exposes a run_command tool that hands its caller-supplied command string to promisify(child_process.exec), so any unauthenticated client able to reach the port could run arbitrary commands as the user running the server, and the filesystem server exposed its file read and write tools on the same terms. The listen default became 127.0.0.1 in commit c2ad42e3eb9b27830db41a3e6f51ca7179d9b168; the package version stayed at 1.2.4 across that change, so the boundary is the commit rather than a release.