CVE-2026-81029
HighCVSS 8.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk22th percentile - higher than 22% of all known CVEs
Summary
OpenMetadata accepts a caller-supplied post-authentication redirect target and appends the issued token to it. SamlLoginServlet reads the callback parameter and stores it in the session without validation, and the assertion consumer later formats it into a URL with the JWT and account details. The OIDC and OAuth2 handlers follow the same pattern. An attacker can craft a link that, after victim login, sends the token to an attacker-controlled destination, allowing account takeover.
Risk Assessment
A user who clicks a malicious link and logs in may lose control of their account, leading to data breaches and unauthorized actions.
Recommendation
Update OpenMetadata to version 2.0.0 or later, which removes the callback parameter. If using 1.x, configure redirect target validation or apply a workaround.
Other vulnerabilities in OpenMetadata
See all- CVE-2026-22244High
OpenMetadata, a unified metadata platform, versions prior to 1.11.4 are vulnerable to remote code execution via Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in FreeMarker email templates. An attacker must have administrative privileges to exploit the vulnerability. Version 1.11.4 contains a patch.
- CVE-2026-46481High
In OpenMetadata prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow and receive cleartext database password and ingestion bot JWT in the HTTP 201 response. The JWT can be reused to access sensitive APIs with bot privileges.
Original NVD description (English source)
OpenMetadata accepts a caller-supplied post-authentication redirect target and appends the issued token to it. SamlLoginServlet reads the callback request parameter and stores it in the HTTP session without comparing it against any configured or registered destination, and the assertion consumer servlet later formats that stored value into a URL carrying the freshly issued JWT together with the account's email and name before sending the redirect. The OIDC and OAuth2 handler follows the same pattern with its own redirect parameter and the issued identity token. A request naming a destination the attacker controls therefore causes the server to deliver a valid token for whoever completes the login to that destination. Because the token authenticates API calls as that account, a user who follows such a link and authenticates hands over control of their account. Version 2.0.0 removes the caller-supplied callback parameter; no 1.x release validates it.