CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80925

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's VLAN mechanism involves dynamically changing hard_header_len when toggling hardware VLAN TX offload. This causes a data race in lockless TX paths, potentially leading to skb_under_panic and a mismatch between allocated headroom and header creation.

Risk Assessment

The risk includes system panics during packet transmission over VLAN interfaces, potentially causing network service disruptions. The data race may also lead to unpredictable network stack behavior, possibly enabling DoS attacks.

Recommendation

Immediately update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that makes hard_header_len and needed_headroom static. Also apply the mentioned backports (e16e960d55a4, cef51860becd) in stable kernel branches.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload Toggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(), which dynamically changed vlandev->hard_header_len. This causes two issues: 1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2) read dev->hard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len, resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called. 2. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom and header creation. Always setting dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally ensures: - dev->hard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev->hard_header_len, eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len. - Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev->hard_header_len + real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN). - vlandev inherits real_dev->needed_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV requirements are honored. - AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at real_dev->hard_header_len. - vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally. Note to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits: e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev") cef51860becd ("macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev")

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS