CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80819

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth RFCOMM subsystem. The rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() function calls rfcomm_dlc_accept() without holding the rfcomm_mutex lock, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when a remote peer sends a DISC frame for a deferred setup connection (BT_DEFER_SETUP). The issue is fixed by taking rfcomm_mutex around rfcomm_dlc_accept() and re-checking the session.

Risk Assessment

A remote attacker over Bluetooth BR/EDR could cause a system crash (kernel panic) or potentially execute arbitrary code in the kernel due to the race condition. The vulnerability requires Bluetooth pairing or connection establishment, but no user interaction beyond accepting the connection.

Recommendation

Apply a Linux kernel update containing the fix (commit adding rfcomm_mutex in the rfcomm_sock_recvmsg path). If unavailable, restrict trusted Bluetooth devices or disable Bluetooth if not required.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() completes a deferred setup by calling rfcomm_dlc_accept() without holding any RFCOMM lock: if (test_and_clear_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags)) { rfcomm_dlc_accept(d); return 0; } and rfcomm_dlc_accept() dereferences the session on its first line: struct sock *sk = d->session->sock->sk; Every other path that touches d->session runs under rfcomm_mutex: rfcomm_dlc_open(), rfcomm_dlc_close(), rfcomm_dlc_exists(), rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), and the RFCOMM thread through rfcomm_process_sessions(). rfcomm_connect_ind() is even documented as "called under rfcomm_lock()". This call site is the only one that skips it. The RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP bit looks like it serialises the accept against teardown, since __rfcomm_dlc_close() returns early when it wins the test_and_clear. But rfcomm_recv_disc() forces the state first: d->state = BT_CLOSED; __rfcomm_dlc_close(d, err); and the early return only covers BT_CONNECT, BT_CONFIG, BT_OPEN and BT_CONNECT2. With the state already BT_CLOSED that switch does not match, the bit is never consulted, and __rfcomm_dlc_close() falls through to rfcomm_dlc_unlink(), which sets d->session = NULL. So a remote DISC on a deferred dlc clears the session while leaving RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP set. The next recvmsg() then passes the test_and_clear and dereferences a NULL session. No timing window is needed: once the DISC has been processed, the dereference is unconditional. Give rfcomm_dlc_accept() the same shape as rfcomm_dlc_open() and rfcomm_dlc_close(): an exported wrapper that takes rfcomm_mutex and re-checks the session, around a __rfcomm_dlc_accept() that the two in-core callers, which already hold the mutex, keep using. Reproduced on a KASAN + PROVE_LOCKING kernel with a BR/EDR peer emulated over /dev/vhci: the peer brings up an ACL link, opens L2CAP on the RFCOMM PSM, starts a session, opens a dlc on a channel bound with BT_DEFER_SETUP, and sends DISC after the socket is accepted. recv() on the accepted socket then hits: Oops: general protection fault KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:rfcomm_dlc_accept+0x54/0x350 Call Trace: rfcomm_sock_recvmsg+0x1cd/0x230 sock_recvmsg+0x166/0x1c0 __sys_recvfrom+0x20d/0x300 0x10 is the offset of sock in struct rfcomm_session. With this patch the same run completes with recv() returning 0 and no report, and lockdep stays quiet, confirming rfcomm_mutex is still taken before lock_sock on this path as it is on the thread side.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS