CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80796

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

The NCI activation parameter extractors (nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep and nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep) lack length checks before memcpy, allowing a crafted notification to cause a slab out-of-bounds read.

Risk Assessment

A remote attacker can send a crafted NCI notification to cause an out-of-bounds kernel memory read, potentially exposing sensitive data or crashing the system.

Recommendation

Apply the patch that adds a data_len parameter to both functions, validates the region, and clamps the copy length.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb. The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time. Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS