CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80781

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In the Linux kernel HID subsystem, a vulnerability was found involving an out-of-bounds read in hid_set_field(). The issue arises because hid_dump_input() is called before the offset bounds check, which with CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled can lead to reading beyond the allocated usage[] array. The bug was reported by XBOW and affects e.g. the picolcd driver.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability may lead to kernel memory disclosure or a system crash (panic) due to an out-of-bounds read. However, exploitation requires specific conditions (debugfs, a suitable HID device), which limits the risk in typical production environments.

Recommendation

Apply the official Linux kernel patch immediately, which moves the hid_dump_input() call after the bounds check. Also consider disabling CONFIG_DEBUG_FS in production environments if not required.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field() hid_set_field() hands field->usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before the guard that bounds offset: hid_dump_input(field->report->device, field->usage + offset, value); if (offset >= field->report_count) { hid_err(...); return -1; } Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage->hid, NULL). The usage[] array is allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds field->maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object. Had the guard run first, offset < report_count <= maxusage would already have confined the pointer to the array. A caller supplies such an offset today. picolcd_fb_send_tile() validates only report->maxfield before issuing hid_set_field(report->field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound field. When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile. KASAN reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards. Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard. Because field->maxusage >= field->report_count, the guard then establishes that field->usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced, for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]>

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS