CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80780

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the HID PIDFF driver (hid_pidff) has a vulnerability involving an out-of-bounds write when the hid->inputs list is empty. The function hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives a pointer to hid_input without checking if the list is empty, leading to a type-confused pointer and writes past the end of the object. An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by plugging in a malicious USB device, with no user interaction or logged-in user required.

Risk Assessment

The risk includes potential local privilege escalation or kernel memory corruption by connecting a crafted USB device. The attack requires no user interaction or special software, making it especially dangerous in environments with physical access to USB ports.

Recommendation

It is recommended to immediately apply the official Linux kernel patch that adds an empty-list check before deriving the pointer and returns -ENODEV. Additionally, restrict physical access to USB ports on critical systems and monitor distribution security advisories.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list) without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers. Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry(). The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from universal_pidff_probe(). Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe() propagates the error and unwinds. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]>

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS