CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80772

Unknown
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In the Linux kernel's HID driver for Nintendo devices, there is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in joycon_ctlr_read_handler(). The function casts an incoming HID report to struct joycon_input_report, guarding only with a 12-byte length check, while the structure is 49 bytes. For an IMU report of exactly 12 bytes, it can read past the declared length, and the data is forwarded to userspace, leaking driver-internal memory. The fix applies the full structure size check.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability could be exploited by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller to leak kernel memory to userspace, potentially revealing sensitive information.

Recommendation

Apply the official Linux kernel patch that adds the full size check, and update the system.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS