CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-80575

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.12%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, a vulnerability was found in the cs40l50-vibra input driver. The driver copies custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect from user space without validating its length, which can lead to out-of-bounds reads and improper indexing of the bank array. Missing length checks (custom_len) and incorrect masking of the bank value (stored as s16) allow an attacker to trigger undesirable behavior.

Risk Assessment

The risk includes potential information disclosure from kernel memory or a system crash (panic) due to out-of-bounds reads. The attack requires access to the EVIOCSFF interface (e.g., via an input device), which can be exploited locally by an unprivileged user.

Recommendation

It is recommended to immediately apply the official patch from the Linux kernel distributor, which adds validation of the data length (custom_len) and changes the variable type storing the bank to u32. Reboot the system after the update to load the new kernel.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything: work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data, periodic->custom_len, sizeof(s16)); work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled: - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it. - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it: base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index; max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index; Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS