CVE-2026-80114
HighCVSS 7.8Summary
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys driver of PassMark products before specified versions contains hard-coded credentials that allow local attackers to perform arbitrary physical memory writes by extracting an 8-byte key embedded as a hardcoded literal and computing valid MD5 authentication tags for arbitrary IOCTL write requests. Attackers can also bypass a secondary validation gate by using the driver's own bit-clear IOCTL to clear a single bit in the gating instruction's displacement byte, causing all subsequent write requests to skip MAC verification, size checks, and Vendor ID checks entirely.
Risk Assessment
The organization is exposed to complete compromise of physical memory integrity, potentially leading to privilege escalation, system takeover, or permanent data corruption. The attack can be performed by a local user without special privileges.
Recommendation
Immediately update PassMark products to versions 11.1 build 1012 (PerformanceTest), 11.1 build 1000 (BurnInTest), and 11.1 build 1016 (OSForensics) or later. Until patched, restrict local access and monitor for unusual driver operations.
Other vulnerabilities in PassMark DirectIo64.sys
See all- CVE-2026-80118High
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys driver of PassMark products (PerformanceTest, BurnInTest, OSForensics) before specified versions allows an unprivileged local user to read all physical memory via a single IOCTL without caller identity check. The handler writes a crash-dump-format image of physical memory to a caller-supplied file path in SYSTEM context, enabling file creation in restricted locations and recovery of other processes' memory. The header exposes kernel module list, process list, and PFN pointers defeating KASLR, and a missing NULL check on an internal locator can cause a kernel crash.
- CVE-2026-80117High
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys driver of PassMark products before specified versions allows local users to issue arbitrary IN and OUT instructions to any x86 I/O port due to missing allowlist or port validation on exposed IOCTLs. Attackers can obtain a device handle and write to sensitive ports including PS/2 controller, CPU reset, CMOS configuration, and interrupt controller ports, causing immediate system reset or other hardware-level manipulation from a standard user account.
- CVE-2026-80116High
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys driver of PassMark products before specified versions allows local users to modify hardware configuration by exploiting exposed IOCTLs with no validation on device selection, register offset, or value. Attackers can obtain a device handle and issue arbitrary PCI configuration space read/write operations to enable Bus Master DMA on any PCI device, halt storage controller I/O by clearing command registers, or remap Base Address Registers to redirect DMA to an attacker-chosen physical address.
- CVE-2026-80113High
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys driver of PassMark products before specified versions allows local users to clear arbitrary bits at any physical memory address due to missing validation of the physical address parameter in an exposed IOCTL handler. Attackers can obtain a device handle and supply an arbitrary 64-bit physical address with a bit index to invoke MmMapIoSpace and clear bits in kernel code pages or page table entries, enabling local privilege escalation or system compromise.
- CVE-2026-80112High
A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys kernel driver of PassMark products before specified versions is due to improper access control, as the device object is created without a security descriptor. Unprivileged local users can open a handle to the device and issue IOCTLs through the permissive default Windows ACL, gaining access to restricted hardware operations regardless of privilege or integrity level.
Original NVD description (English source)
PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain a hard-coded credentials vulnerability in DirectIo64.sys that allows local attackers to perform arbitrary physical memory writes by extracting an 8-byte key embedded as a hardcoded literal in the distributed binary and computing valid MD5 authentication tags for arbitrary IOCTL write requests. Attackers can additionally bypass a secondary validation gate by using the driver's own bit-clear IOCTL to clear a single bit in the gating instruction's displacement byte, causing all subsequent write requests to skip MAC verification, size checks, and Vendor ID checks entirely.