CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-79982

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.23%

14th percentile - higher than 14% of all known CVEs

Summary

A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Bluetooth HCI USB transport class (subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c) of the new USB device stack. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() copies controller-to-host HCI packets into a fixed-size buffer of USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 bytes) without a length check, while packets can be much larger (e.g., the Read Supported Commands event is 70 bytes). In production builds (CONFIG_ASSERT=n) this silently corrupts memory, potentially leading to remote code execution or denial of service.

Risk Assessment

An unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes via Data Length Extension negotiation or extended advertising data, corrupting memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool. On targets without memory protection between subsystems this may lead to arbitrary code execution, while builds with assertions enabled panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service.

Recommendation

Update to a version containing the fix, which introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction. Until patched, consider disabling raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW) or limiting Bluetooth exposure.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool. The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization. Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS