CVE-2026-78118
HighCVSS 7.0Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk0th percentile - higher than 0% of all known CVEs
Summary
A race condition in the Zephyr kernel affects z_waitq_head(), which on SMP systems reads the head of a thread wait queue without holding the _sched_spinlock. The race between timer expiration handling and thread abort can cause out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context plus scheduler state corruption.
Risk Assessment
A local unprivileged user-mode thread can trigger the race against kernel-owned data, most often resulting in a kernel crash and potentially in uncontrolled memory corruption. Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build and winning a narrow timing window.
Recommendation
Update the Zephyr kernel to a version containing the fix that splits z_waitq_head_locked() and z_waitq_head() and places the head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region. Until patched, restrict untrusted user-mode code execution on SMP systems.
Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr kernel
See all- CVE-2026-12631Medium
A vulnerability in the Zephyr kernel affects the k_thread_join() and k_thread_abort() system calls. An error in access validation (thread_obj_validate()) allows an unprivileged user thread to invoke these functions on a thread object it does not own. Instead of terminating the offending thread, execution reaches undefined behavior, potentially causing a kernel crash (on Clang) or an access-control bypass (on GCC).
- CVE-2026-11742Low
A vulnerability in the Zephyr kernel's z_queue_node_peek() in kernel/queue.c reads a node from the data_q list without holding the queue spinlock. A concurrent k_queue_get() can free the node during the operation, leading to use-after-free and a dangling pointer. This affects k_fifo and k_lifo queues used in net_buf, Bluetooth, USB, and networking subsystems.
Original NVD description (English source)
The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive. When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer. The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data. Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

