CVE-2026-75084

MediumCVSS 6.8

Published: 14/10/2026(UTC)Updated: 16/10/2026(UTC)Translated: 14/10/2026(UTC)NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk

0.29%

20th percentile - higher than 20% of all known CVEs

Summary

The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver reads the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity(), which only enforces a lower bound (pkt_len < 3) and never bounds large values. Because the radio is configured for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the over-the-air length byte (0-255) reaches net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the SPI burst read unclamped. An unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame with a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127, causing a write past the end of a network buffer fragment.

Risk Assessment

This can corrupt the network-buffer pool and cause crashes. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is memory corruption and denial of service rather than a controlled write or code execution.

Recommendation

Update the driver to a version that adds an upper bound on the packet length, if available. If patching is not possible, consider disabling CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 or restricting radio exposure to trusted devices.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len < 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped. An unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf->data and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS