CVE-2026-72103
HighCVSS 7.3Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the Linux kernel's dm module, there is a leak of the caller's thread keyring via the table device file. This causes the LUKS volume key to remain in memory after luksSuspend, potentially allowing its recovery.
Risk Assessment
The vulnerability may lead to disclosure of sensitive data (encryption keys) in memory, posing a serious risk to data confidentiality.
Recommendation
Apply the kernel patch that restores pre-v6.9 behavior to ensure the key is wiped from memory after luksSuspend, and restrict access to cryptsetup operations.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file The refactoring in commit a28d893eb327 ("md: port block device access to file") accidentally causes the caller's thread keyring to be kept alive long beyond the caller's lifetime. As a result, "cryptsetup luksSuspend" silently fails to wipe the LUKS volume key from memory. In detail: "cryptsetup luksOpen" uses its supposedly ephemeral thread keyring to pass the volume key to the kernel. dm-crypt's crypt_set_keyring_key() copies the key material into its own crypt_config structure and then drops its own reference to the key in the keyring with key_put(). With this fix, restoring pre-v6.9 behavior, the copy in the thread keyring is then promptly garbage collected, such that exactly one copy of the volume key remains. This single copy is correctly wiped from memory on "cryptsetup luksSuspend". Without this fix, the thread keyring and the volume key in it remains. This second copy is only freed on "luksClose". "luksSuspend" neither knows about this copy nor has any way to remove it, so the key remains recoverable from RAM after a suspend that is documented to have wiped it. This fix should not introduce new security problems, as the code is anyway gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The device-mapper core, not the calling task, is the legitimate owner of this long-lived file.