CVE-2026-69192
HighCVSS 7.7Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk21th percentile - higher than 21% of all known CVEs
Summary
ip-address is a JavaScript library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo decode a leading zero as octal. This causes a disagreement between the library and the network stack about which host a string names. For example, new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() as 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() as false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1.
Risk Assessment
An application that builds network trust-boundary decisions on these checks, such as an SSRF filter, may classify an internal target as external and allow the request, leading to potential data leakage or unauthorized access.
Recommendation
Upgrade to version 10.3.1, which contains the fix.
Other vulnerabilities in ip-address
See all- CVE-2026-69198Medium
The ip-address library for JavaScript versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.2 contains a vulnerability where special-use classification methods (isLoopback, isPrivate, isLinkLocal, isCGNAT, isMulticast, isUnspecified, isBroadcast, isULA, getType) rely on isInSubnet, which returns false when the address's subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. Appending a CIDR suffix like /0 causes all these methods to report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. Applications using these checks for network trust-boundary decisions, such as SSRF filters, may treat an internal target as external and allow the request. Fixed in version 10.2.2.
- CVE-2026-54272Medium
The ip-address library in JavaScript versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 is vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. These addresses are incorrectly classified as Global unicast, bypassing isLoopback, isUnspecified, isMulticast, isLinkLocal, and isULA checks. For IPv4-mapped addresses, this is reachable on any dual-stack host; for NAT64, it requires a NAT64/DNS64 gateway.
- CVE-2026-42338Medium
The ip-address library before version 10.1.1 does not HTML-escape attacker-controlled content before embedding it in returned HTML strings. An application passing untrusted input to Address6 and rendering the output as HTML is vulnerable to cross-site scripting.
Original NVD description (English source)
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. The defect is in the parse gate rather than in any one classifier, so every consumer of Address4 inherits it: isPrivate(), isLoopback(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isInSubnet(), isHostInSubnet(), and correctForm() are all computed from the mis-decoded octets. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.1.