CVE-2026-68433
HighCVSS 8.6Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk21th percentile - higher than 21% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the Linux kernel's libceph library, there is a bug in handle_get_version_reply() which uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. Since this is the buffer size, not the actual received bytes, a truncated reply can cause an uninitialized memory read from stale tail bytes.
Risk Assessment
The vulnerability may lead to disclosure of uninitialized kernel memory, potentially exposing sensitive data or facilitating attacks on the system.
Recommendation
Apply the Linux kernel update containing the fix that uses msg->front.iov_len as the decode boundary.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read. Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire.