CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-66077

HighCVSS 7.3
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.30%

20th percentile - higher than 20% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the RabbitMQ management UI (versions prior to 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6), TLS client certificate details such as Subject and Issuer DN are rendered without HTML escaping. The vulnerability is reachable when a TLS listener is configured with verify_peer and an attacker holds a CA-signed client certificate with an arbitrary Subject CN. When an administrator views that connection in the UI, the injected script executes in the admin's browser session, leading to account takeover.

Risk Assessment

An attacker with a client certificate signed by a trusted CA can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the administrator's browser, enabling full account takeover, user creation, and definition export. This is especially risky in deployments using mTLS for client authentication.

Recommendation

Upgrade RabbitMQ to version 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, or 4.2.6, which contain the fix. Additionally, consider restricting the ability to obtain client certificates with arbitrary Subject CNs and strengthening the management UI's CSP policy.

Other vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS