CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-64445

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.32%

24th percentile - higher than 24% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the rtl8723bs driver in the Linux kernel, an underflow and OOB read occur in OnAuth() when a short authentication frame causes negative length calculation in rtw_wep_decrypt(), leading to out-of-bounds read. Also, memcmp always reads 128 bytes regardless of actual IE length.

Risk Assessment

Out-of-bounds read can lead to information disclosure or system crashes, and a remote attacker can exploit this by sending crafted frames.

Recommendation

Apply the Linux kernel patch that adds minimum length checks before WEP decryption and validates Challenge Text IE length.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient().

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS