CVE-2026-64293
HighCVSS 7.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the Linux kernel's iommufd subsystem, a bug exists in iommufd_veventq_fops_read(). The bound check for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) instead of sizeof(*hdr), causing an undercount on 32-bit architectures and writing past the user-supplied buffer.
Risk Assessment
Buffer overrun in user space can corrupt application memory, potentially causing application crashes or privilege escalation.
Recommendation
Update the Linux kernel to a version that includes the fix using sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in the bound check.
Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel
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- CVE-2026-80542Unknown
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- CVE-2026-80535Unknown
In the Linux kernel XFS filesystem, during directory tree repair, a self-referential directory may be detected. In such a case, the repair code attempts to lock the same inode twice (double iolock/ilock), leading to a deadlock. The fix detects this corner case and handles it appropriately.
- CVE-2026-80533Unknown
In the Linux kernel XFS filesystem, during AGI repair, the function xrep_iunlink_walk_ondisk_bucket may attempt to use the pointer sc->sa.agi_bp, which can be null if the buffer verifier fails. The fix uses ragi->agi_bp instead, which skips verifier checks, to avoid walking off the end of memory.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr): if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) && sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) { hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently: if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr); struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended. On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer. It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width. Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.