CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-64273

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.16%

6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the iforce driver lacks validation of the force-feedback effect index from the device. The index masked only with 0x7f (range 0-127) is used to address the core_effects[] array with only 32 entries, causing out-of-bounds read/write. A malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an arbitrary offset past the object.

Risk Assessment

An attacker using a counterfeit device can cause kernel memory corruption, potentially leading to system crash (DoS) or privilege escalation. The vulnerability affects both USB and serio interfaces.

Recommendation

Immediately update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix that rejects indices outside the IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) range. Check your distribution for the available patch.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

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Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS