CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-63895

Low risk· EPSS 16%
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.24%

16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel USB gadget FunctionFS (f_fs), a vulnerability was found where the entire allocated buffer for a control OUT request is copied to userspace instead of only the actually received bytes. On a short packet transfer, this leaks uninitialized kernel memory (slab residue) to the FunctionFS daemon process.

Risk Assessment

The risk involves potential leakage of sensitive kernel memory data to a privileged USB daemon process (e.g., adbd, UMS). Although only reachable from privileged context, it could enable information escalation in environments where the daemon handles sensitive data.

Recommendation

Apply the official kernel patch that limits copying to only the actually received bytes (ret). Update the kernel to a patched version or manually apply the fix commit.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path). * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket. * renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request. * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS