CVE-2026-63400

In Coop before 1.0.2, addAccessibleQueuesForUser and removeAccessibleQueuesForUser accepted arbitrary queueId and userId values without organization scoping. An authenticated user belonging to one organization and holding MRT queue-edit permission could grant or revoke another organization's users' access to manual review queues. The existing queue-edit permission check did not bind the supplied identifiers to the caller's organization. The attacker could not read the other organization's queues or jobs, so this issue did not disclose confidential data.

In Coop before 1.0.0, the GraphQL Mutation.createOrg operation allows an unauthenticated actor to create arbitrary organizations on a publicly accessible instance. In addition to creating noise in the logs, the lack of rate limiting could potentially lead to database exhaustion. Running the service on an authenticated private network prevents outside actors from directly querying the GraphQL API.

In Coop prior to 1.0.2, the SAML strategy verify callback resolved the authenticated user by email alone using kyselyUserFindByEmail, without binding the lookup to the organization in /saml/login/:orgId/callback. An attacker who administers an organization and controls its SAML IdP signing key can submit an assertion for a victim email to another organization's callback when that target organization has registered the same signing certificate.

In Coop prior to 1.0.0, an unauthenticated actor can query Query.allOrgs through /api/v1/graphql on a publicly accessible deployment and obtain data for all organizations, including IDs, names, email addresses, website URLs and on-call alert email addresses. The usersWhoCanReviewEveryQueue field also exposes reviewing users' IDs, email addresses, names, roles, permissions and creation dates.