CVE-2026-62236

The Grav Login plugin versions 2.7.0 through 3.9.9 contain an authentication bypass in processUserProfile(), which checks that the session user exists but not that a pending front-end 2FA session is fully authorized. Attackers with a victim's password who can publish a page form without an access rule can invoke update_user before completing 2FA to disable twofa_enabled and take over the account.

The Grav Login plugin (grav-plugin-login) versions <= 3.8.11 contain a privilege escalation flaw in the authenticated profile self-update handler (processUserProfile(), the update_user task). Unlike the registration handler, this handler does not strip privilege fields ('groups','access') from user-submitted form data before persisting them. When an administrator has added 'groups' and/or 'access' to plugins.login.user_registration.fields and the default 'regular'/DataUser account backend is in use, a low-privilege authenticated user can POST crafted profile form data (e.g. access[admin][super]=true) to escalate to super-admin, enabling admin panel access, scheduler abuse (RCE), and Twig evaluation. Fixed in 3.8.12.

Grav Login plugin before 1.0.16 fails to validate the target account's privilege level in the onApiUserListRowAction unlock handler. An attacker with api.users.write permission can clear login lockout counters on admin.super accounts, removing brute-force protection from the highest-privilege accounts.

Grav is a file-based web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-beta.2, the Login::register() method in the Login plugin accepts attacker-controlled groups and access fields from the registration POST data without server-side validation.

Grav Login plugin 1.2.0 before 3.9.9 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows publishers to obtain password-reset tokens by authoring a page at the reset route. When a victim opens an emailed reset link, the publisher-controlled page rendered by Login::getPage() exposes the username and bearer token, enabling takeover of more privileged accounts.

The Grav Login plugin versions 2.7.0 through 3.9.9 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows an attacker with a valid password to skip two-factor authentication by restoring a persistent remember-me cookie. Attackers can obtain such a cookie after the password step and restore it as a fully authorized session without completing the second factor.

The getgrav/grav-plugin-login Composer plugin before 3.9.1 (used by Grav) compares password reset and account activation tokens using a non-constant-time === string comparison instead of hash_equals() in classes/Controller.php (taskReset()) and login.php (activation handler). Because the token-submission endpoint (taskReset) also lacks rate limiting, an attacker could in principle send repeated token guesses against a known username and use the timing differences to attempt to recover a valid token, though the vendor rates the practical exploitability as low and no end-to-end network exploit has been demonstrated.

The Grav Login plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-login) before 3.9.1 is vulnerable to email address enumeration. The register() method in classes/Login.php throws a distinct exception (EMAIL_NOT_AVAILABLE) when a submitted email address already belongs to an existing account, while allowing registration to proceed otherwise. Because the registration endpoint has no rate limiting, an attacker can enumerate which email addresses have accounts on the site, one guess per request.

The Grav Login plugin prior to 3.8.11 accepts the login.regenerate2FASecret task via a top-level GET request without requiring a nonce, Origin check, or Referer check. Under default SameSite=Lax policy, an off-site navigation can invoke taskRegenerate2FASecret() in a logged-in victim's session, overwrite the TOTP secret, and force two-factor re-enrollment.

The Grav Login plugin before version 3.8.11 contains a vulnerability in the login.regenerate2FASecret task that only checks that the pending-session user exists rather than requiring $user->authorized. After submitting a victim's correct password, an attacker can invoke taskRegenerate2FASecret() during the pending TOTP challenge, overwrite twofa_secret, read the replacement secret from the response, calculate a valid code, and complete authentication without the victim's second factor. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.11.