CVE-2026-58370
HighCVSS 8.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk42th percentile — higher than 42% of all known CVEs
Summary
A vulnerability in Woodpecker before version 3.15.0 allows bypassing the ApprovalAllowedUsers list by manipulating the pipeline.Author field. For GitLab integration, the commit author is taken from webhook data which can be attacker-controlled. A user opening a merge request from a fork can set the commit author name to match an entry in ApprovalAllowedUsers, causing the pipeline to run without required approval.
Risk Assessment
The risk involves breaking the fork-approval security boundary, allowing execution of attacker-controlled pipeline steps on a Woodpecker agent and exfiltration of CI secrets exposed during the run.
Recommendation
Immediately update Woodpecker to version 3.15.0 or later. If an update is not possible, consider temporarily disabling GitLab integration or restricting fork access.
Original NVD description (English source)
Woodpecker before 3.15.0 matches the ApprovalAllowedUsers bypass list against pipeline.Author. For the GitLab forge driver, pipeline.Author is populated from the git commit author name (commit.author.name) carried in the webhook payload, which is attacker-controlled and not verified by GitLab. A user who can open a merge request from a fork can set the commit author name to match an entry in ApprovalAllowedUsers, causing needsApproval to return false so the pipeline runs without the required approval. This defeats the fork-approval security boundary and allows execution of attacker-controlled pipeline steps on a Woodpecker agent and exfiltration of CI secrets exposed to the run. Other built-in forge drivers (Gitea, Forgejo, GitHub, Bitbucket) derive pipeline.Author from the forge-validated sender/actor identity and are not affected.