CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-58271

MediumCVSS 6.8
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In Sync-in Server prior to version 2.4.0, the failed-TOTP lockout mechanism does not work because the passwordAttempts counter is never incremented. An attacker can brute-force TOTP codes without limit, and upon success obtain a client token exchangeable for a full JWT and permanently disable MFA.

Risk Assessment

Loss of effective MFA protection allows an attacker to take over accounts and permanently weaken authentication security in the organization.

Recommendation

Upgrade Sync-in Server to version 2.4.0 or later, and until then monitor for unusual sync client registration attempts and MFA disablement.

Other vulnerabilities in Sync-in Server

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Original NVD description (English source)

Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/app/sync/register` accepts credentials and a TOTP code to register a desktop sync client. On a failed TOTP, `SyncClientsManager.register()` calls `updateAccesses(user, ip, false)`, which hits a freeze branch that writes `passwordAttempts` back unchanged. The counter never reaches `USER_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS` (10) and the lockout gate never fires. A successful guess returns a `{clientId, clientToken}` pair. The token can be exchanged via `POST /api/app/sync/auth/cookie` for a full JWT. While the code is valid, the attacker can also call `POST /api/auth/2fa/disable` to permanently remove MFA. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS