CVE-2026-57112

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, createAgentLoop() in src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts passes executable tools to generateText() before invoking the onToolCall approval callback. Because the wrapped AI SDK executes tool handlers during generation, a callback that returns false records tool_rejected only after the denied tool has already produced side effects.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, CommandValidator in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts validates only the first whitespace-delimited executable against allowedCommands, then SandboxExecutor passes the complete command string to sh -c. A command beginning with an allowed executable can append a non-allowlisted command through shell metacharacters.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts uses buildEnv() only to inject invalid http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables and does not establish an OS-level network boundary. Programs that ignore those proxy variables can open sockets directly.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.1 until 1.7.2, MCPSecurity.evaluatePolicy() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/security.ts invokes the configured credential validator only when AuthMethod is api-key or bearer. Basic and OAuth policies accept any non-empty Authorization header without calling auth.validate(), then return an authenticated result.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.1 until 1.7.2, the shell() helper exported from src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts checks only the first whitespace-delimited token against safeCommands and then passes the complete original string to child_process.exec(). A string that starts with an allowed read-only command can append a second non-allowlisted command through shell syntax.

In PraisonAI prior to 4.6.62, setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH to disabled makes verify_token accept requests to /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN authentication. Deployments using the advertised opt-out can expose registered agents and their connected tools or private context to unauthenticated invocation.

In PraisonAI prior to 4.6.59, the WhatsApp and Linear bot webhook handlers verify HMAC signatures only when WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET or LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is configured, otherwise parsing and dispatching unsigned request bodies. A remote unauthenticated client reaching the webhook route can forge messages, comments, or agent-session events, impersonate platform users, and disrupt bot processing.

In PraisonAI prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data.

In PraisonAI prior to 4.6.59, the CODE_TOOLS wrappers keep _workspace_root as None and pass workspace=None to read_file, search_replace, and apply_diff helpers that enforce path containment only for a truthy workspace. An application exposing code_read_file, code_search_replace, or code_apply_diff before set_workspace can let prompt-influenced calls read and modify files outside the intended project directory.

In PraisonAI prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py interpolates LLM-controlled from_addr, subject, and query values directly into quoted IMAP SEARCH criteria. Embedded quote, backslash, newline, or null characters can escape the intended criterion and alter IMAP operations when search_emails, reply_email, or archive_email is exposed to an agent with configured email credentials, allowing mailbox data access, modification, deletion, or connection disruption.