CVE-2026-55658
HighCVSS 7.7Summary
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In 3e595f3 and prior, when a streaming proposal is funded, the cluster of streaming contracts moves real pool funds into the proposal's StreamingEscrow to back the Superfluid constant flow agreement (the CFA deposit, plus a 0.5 percent margin). cancelProposal then zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but never reclaims that parked balance, and the permissionless claim() forwards the escrow's entire balance, including the pool funded buffer, to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter. The only path that returns escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy, which is onlyStrategy and is reached solely from the dispute reject ruling, never from cancel or natural completion. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.
Risk Assessment
An attacker could exploit proposal cancellation or permissionless claim() to drain escrow funds, potentially leading to financial losses for the pool and compromising system integrity.
Recommendation
Monitor security advisories for Gardens v2 and apply patches when published. Restrict access to cancellation and claim() functions and audit escrow transactions.
Other vulnerabilities in Gardens v2
See all- CVE-2026-57445High
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In dfba919e218e20d52db9f7b2e8d292d45a46c91b and prior, normal beneficiary payout paths in StreamingEscrow preserve depositAmount() while an active stream needs an escrow reserve. However, the approve-side dispute resolution path drains the whole available escrow balance to the proposal beneficiary. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.
- CVE-2026-53924High
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. Prior to 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9, StreamingEscrow.claim() correctly rejects withdrawals while an escrow is disputed, but the permissionless syncOutflow() path performs the same excess-balance transfer without checking disputed. After a streaming proposal is challenged, anyone can call syncOutflow() to transfer escrowed SuperTokens to the proposal beneficiary while the dispute is pending. If the proposal is later rejected, those tokens cannot be recovered by drainToStrategy(). This issue has been patched in 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9.
Original NVD description (English source)
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In 3e595f3 and prior, when a streaming proposal is funded, the cluster of streaming contracts moves real pool funds into the proposal's StreamingEscrow to back the Superfluid constant flow agreement (the CFA deposit, plus a 0.5 percent margin). cancelProposal then zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but never reclaims that parked balance, and the permissionless claim() forwards the escrow's entire balance, including the pool funded buffer, to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter. The only path that returns escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy, which is onlyStrategy and is reached solely from the dispute reject ruling, never from cancel or natural completion. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.