CVE-2026-55457

The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 22.04 to before version 26.05, the unauthenticated REST endpoint GET /api/v1/index/{solrField}/spatial/search concatenates the user-supplied region query parameter directly into a Solr query string with no escaping, no local-param stripping, and no runtime schema enforcement. An attacker can inject Solr local-param syntax ({!parent ...}, {!join ...}) and boolean operators to make access-restricted georeferenced records match the query, bypassing the access-condition filter. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.

In Goobi viewer, several Jakarta WebSocket endpoints (DownloadTaskEndpoint, CampaignEndpoint, AutocompleteEndpoint, UserEndpoint) accept connections without verifying that the associated HttpSession belongs to a logged-in user, and none validate the Origin header against an allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to these endpoints; through CampaignEndpoint this allows polluting the in-process crowdsourcing page-lock map and broadcasting forged lock messages, disrupting reviewers' work.

In Goobi viewer from version 25.01 to before 26.05, AuthenticationEndpoint.verifyOpenIdToken does not enforce the aud claim during cryptographic validation, and the manual check only handles single-string aud values. In a multi-RP IdP setup, a token issued for a different relying party can authenticate the attacker.

In Goobi viewer, the legacy RSS servlet (RssResolver, GET /rss/) accepts the q and filterQuery parameters and concatenates them into Solr queries without validation. q forms the main query body (wrapped only in literal parentheses), while filterQuery is passed directly as a Solr fq. An unauthenticated attacker can inject Solr boolean operators to break out of the wrapping and render the trailing access-condition filter-query suffix optional, so that access-restricted records are included in the generated RSS feed.

In Goobi viewer, SolrTools.cleanUpQuery() strips Solr local-parameter syntax ({!...}) from user-supplied query strings before they reach Solr. Its regex can be bypassed by wrapping the local parameter in a second pair of curly braces ({{!...}}): the outer braces are stripped, the inner {!...} survives intact, and a valid Solr local parameter is forwarded. The flaw is in the shared sanitizer, so it affects any endpoint that routes user input through cleanUpQuery.

In Goobi viewer before version 26.05, when a password reset link is visited, the application generates a replacement password in a predictable way and emails it to the account holder. The insufficient entropy allows the password to be brute-forced by an attacker who can approximate the server-side generation time.

In Goobi viewer before version 26.05, the password reset token is predictably based on the time of the reset request. An attacker who knows the target's email address can request a reset and then brute-force the token. Exploiting this finding alone forces an unauthorized password reset on any account.

In Goobi viewer from version 25.08 to before 26.05, the IIIF Auth 2.0 endpoints auth/login and auth/token accept an origin query parameter without validation and embed it into the Content-Security-Policy header and an HTML response body as a postMessage argument. Since the attacker controls both calls, the unescaped value yields reflected XSS.

In Goobi viewer from version 24.03 to before 26.05, ExternalFilesDownloader.getFilename() extracts the filename from a server-supplied Content-Disposition header and passes it directly to Path.resolve() without stripping directory components. A malicious HTTP server can supply an absolute path or ../ sequences, writing attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path, leading to remote code execution.

In Goobi viewer from version 24.03 to before 26.05, the DownloadTaskEndpoint WebSocket endpoint (/tasks/download/monitor.socket) in goobi-viewer-core accepts download requests from unauthenticated users. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.