CVE-2026-55177

HighCVSS 7.6

Published: 30/09/2026(UTC)Updated: 30/09/2026(UTC)Translated: 30/09/2026(UTC)NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk

0.40%

31th percentile - higher than 31% of all known CVEs

Summary

CloudTAK versions prior to 13.10.0 contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the ESRI route family (api/routes/esri.ts). These routes accept an attacker-controlled URL and fetch it without any validation against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user can force the CloudTAK server to make requests to internal resources, and the responses are returned to the attacker.

Risk Assessment

An attacker can read cloud instance metadata (including temporary IAM credentials), enumerate and query internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. Since only any valid authentication is required (not an admin account), the risk is high for any CloudTAK deployment.

Recommendation

Update CloudTAK to version 13.10.0 or later, which contains the fix. Until then, restrict access to the /api/esri/* routes and consider blocking outbound traffic to private, loopback, and link-local ranges at the network level.

Other vulnerabilities in CloudTAK

CVE-2026-54546Medium
CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to 13.22.1, the authenticated PUT /api/basemap endpoint passes an attacker-controlled URL through importBasemapURL() to fetch(url) without resolved-address classification or redirect revalidation. BasemapProtocol.isValidURL checks only the HTTP or HTTPS scheme and is not applied on the vulnerable import path. Direct internal addresses, alternate IP encodings, and redirects to internal addresses can reach cloud metadata, loopback, private, and CGNAT HTTP services. The OptionalTileJSON response reflects fields including name, attribution, and tiles[0] to the caller, making the request forgery full-read rather than blind and enabling cloud credential theft and internal service disclosure.

Original NVD description (English source)

CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS