CVE-2026-54083
HighCVSS 8.1Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk26th percentile - higher than 26% of all known CVEs
Summary
The ip-customblock active response script in Wazuh contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to create or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. The script does not validate the IP address in the srcip field, enabling the use of ../ sequences to escape the base directory.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can delete or create sensitive system files, such as credentials or Wazuh configuration, potentially leading to full system compromise. This may also disrupt services.
Recommendation
Upgrade Wazuh to version 4.14.7. Restrict the ability to trigger active responses from untrusted sources.
Original NVD description (English source)
Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. The ip-customblock active response script contains a path traversal vulnerability that lets an attacker create or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. The script builds a file path by concatenating the srcip field taken from alert JSON directly onto the fixed /ipblock/ base directory, without validating that the value is a well-formed IP address. Because the extraction routine returns the raw string unchecked, an attacker who can trigger alert-matching log events with a crafted srcip containing ../ sequences can escape the base directory. The block action opens the resulting path in append mode, creating an empty file at an arbitrary location, while the unblock action passes it to remove(), deleting an arbitrary file; since the active response daemon runs as root, this includes sensitive files such as system credentials and Wazuh configuration. Unlike the sibling scripts host-deny.c, default-firewall-drop.c, and firewalld-drop.c, which reject non-IP input via get_ip_version(), ip-customblock.c omits this validation. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.