CVE-2026-53639
MediumCVSS 6.3Summary
Sylius, an open-source eCommerce framework on Symfony, contains a vulnerability in versions from 2.0.0 to 2.0.17, 2.1.14, and 2.2.5. The GET and PUT API endpoints for payment requests do not verify resource ownership based on the hash, allowing an attacker to read payment and order data and modify redirect fields. A similar issue affects payment creation, where order ownership is not checked.
Risk Assessment
An attacker who obtains a payment hash (e.g., from logs or shared links) can access full order details, including addresses and customer email, and redirect the buyer to a malicious site after payment, potentially leading to data theft or session hijacking.
Recommendation
Immediately upgrade Sylius to version 2.0.18, 2.1.15, or 2.2.6. If upgrading is not possible, apply the workaround by adding query extensions and decorators to verify resource ownership.
Other vulnerabilities in Sylius
See all- CVE-2026-53638Medium
Sylius, an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony, contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the shop account API. The PATCH /api/v2/shop/account/orders/{tokenValue}/payments/{paymentId} endpoint does not validate that the chosen payment method is enabled for the order's channel, allowing an authenticated customer to assign any globally enabled payment method to their order, including methods excluded by the store operator.
- CVE-2026-53637Medium
Sylius, an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony, contains an improper workflow enforcement vulnerability in the cart FormComponent. When an order is completed while its cart page remains open, the stale LiveComponent does not detect the order's changed state and continues to permit cart actions, allowing an authenticated customer to modify or permanently delete an already completed order.
Original NVD description (English source)
Sylius is an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.0.18, 2.1.15, and 2.2.6, the `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order. An attacker who obtains a payment request hash can read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals); and/or update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer. The hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token. The creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying that the caller owns the order. The issue is fixed in versions 2.0.18, 2.1.15, and 2.2.6. As a workaround, add a query extension that filters the `GET` operation; decorate the `PUT` state provider, guard the `POST` creation endpoint with a command-bus middleware, and wire the services.