CVE-2026-52828

In Kimai, the KIMAI_SESSION cookie issued after password verification but before TOTP completion is accepted by every /api route because config/packages/security.yaml protects the API with IS_AUTHENTICATED and App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher routes an existing session through the main firewall. A Scheb TwoFactorToken satisfies that access rule, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API access to its User, allowing an attacker with a valid account password to use authenticated REST API operations without entering the second factor even though web routes remain blocked. This issue is fixed in version 2.59.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.57.0, GET or POST requests to /en/admin/project/{id}/rate/{rate}, /en/admin/customer/{id}/rate/{rate}, and /en/admin/activity/{id}/rate/{rate} independently resolve the authorized parent identifier and the attacker-selected child rate identifier without confirming that the ProjectRate, CustomerRate, or ActivityRate belongs to that parent. An authenticated user who can edit one parent object can pair it with a rate record from an unauthorized project, customer, or activity and persist changes to billing configuration in kimai2_projects_rates, kimai2_customers_rates, or kimai2_activities_rates. This issue is fixed in version 2.57.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.58.0, POST /api/teams/{id}/members/{userId} and POST /api/teams/{id}/activities/{activityId} verify that a teamlead may edit the Team but do not verify access_user for the referenced User or view access for the referenced Activity. A teamlead can add users or activities outside the teamlead's manageable scope to an editable team, bypassing the narrower choices enforced by TeamEditForm and UserRepository::getQueryBuilderForFormType(). The resulting relationships can be trusted by RolePermissionManager::checkTeamAccessActivity() and other team-based authorization, visibility, reporting, and workflow logic. This issue is fixed in version 2.58.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.58.0, TimesheetController exposes GET /api/timesheets/{id}/stop and GET /api/timesheets/{id}/restart, which reuse an authenticated browser session and perform state-changing operations through GET requests without a request-forgery defense. A remote attacker can cause a logged-in user to request either route from attacker-controlled content, stopping a running timesheet or restarting a historical entry to create and start a new timesheet without the user's consent. The unauthorized changes can corrupt time records, billing, reports, approvals, and audits. This issue is fixed in version 2.58.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.58.0, PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/restart, PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/duplicate, and the web duplicate workflow can derive a new record from an owned historical timesheet after the user's access to its project or activity has been revoked. TimesheetVoter evaluates the own-timesheet permission before current team access, and its canStart() logic validates object visibility but does not verify the user's current team access to the referenced project and activity. An old entry therefore acts as a persistent capability to create new time records under an unauthorized project and activity, corrupting budgets, statistics, reports, and invoices after an administrative revocation. This issue is fixed in version 2.58.0.

Prior to version 2.57.0 of Kimai, GET or POST requests to /en/admin/activity/create/{project} and /en/admin/project/create/{customer} required only the generic create_activity or create_project capability and did not verify edit access to the supplied Project or Customer object. A user knowing a valid project.id or customer identifier could create a new child business object under an unauthorized parent, polluting project or customer configuration and influencing later time-entry, rate, reporting, and billing behavior.

Prior to version 2.57.0 of Kimai, the PATCH /api/timesheets/{id} and POST /api/timesheets endpoints accepted a user-controlled project identifier that bypassed team access criteria. Any authenticated user with edit_own_timesheet could assign an owned timesheet to a project outside the user's teams, persist unauthorized project attribution, and retrieve project and customer metadata through GET /api/timesheets/{id}?full=true.

Prior to version 2.57.0 of Kimai, the GET /api/timesheets list endpoint accepted user identifiers from a caller with view_other_timesheet but did not verify that a ROLE_TEAMLEAD requester leads a team containing each target user. This allowed a teamlead to retrieve another user's descriptions, timing data, tags, rate, and internalRate even though GET /api/timesheets/{id} would deny access.

Kimai versions before 2.65.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the REST API timesheet collection endpoint that fails to enforce activity-team access controls. Users with view_other_timesheet permission can list timesheets using activities restricted to teams they do not belong to, bypassing intended data isolation.

Kimai through 2.65.0 contains a business logic / improper authorization vulnerability in the default team creation endpoints. An authenticated user with project permission-management privileges can create or use a customer, project, or activity whose name matches an existing team; because the endpoints POST /api/customers/{id}/team, POST /api/projects/{id}/team, and POST /api/activities/{id}/team reuse an existing team of the same name and add the current user as teamlead without verifying that the user is authorized to manage that team, the attacker gains unauthorized team-lead (administration) rights over the existing team. Fixed in 2.65.0.