CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-48079

HighCVSS 7.4
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.39%

31th percentile - higher than 31% of all known CVEs

Summary

Prior to version 1.0.2 of OpenReception, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires.

Risk Assessment

The risk is that the session remains active after logout, which could allow a third party to access the user's account without their knowledge. This can lead to unauthorized access to data or actions in the system.

Recommendation

Update OpenReception to version 1.0.2 or later, which initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies. Version 2.0.0 replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.

Other vulnerabilities in OpenReception

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS