CVE-2026-47361

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, the app tags Crashlytics data with the user's Datadog UUID, with no user-facing opt-out. Impact: The Datadog user UUID and crash data are visible within Firebase Crashlytics. This UUID is not identifying outside Datadog's own systems.

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend. This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app. Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.

In Datadog Android app versions prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history).

In the Datadog Android app before v545-5.9.2, six widget configuration activities are exported without permission guards. A malicious app can exploit sequential widget IDs to hijack a user's session and display infrastructure data on screen.

In Datadog Android app versions prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.