CVE-2026-46591
HighCVSS 8.2Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk13th percentile - higher than 13% of all known CVEs
Summary
A vulnerability in the Neo4J component of Apache Camel allows Cypher injection through property names in the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map. Although property values are bound as parameters, JSON key names are concatenated verbatim into the query, enabling an attacker to alter the query structure and perform arbitrary operations on the Neo4j database.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can read, modify, or delete any nodes and relationships in the Neo4j database, compromising data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The risk is especially high when a route processes untrusted input as the match properties map.
Recommendation
Upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for LTS 4.14.x, 4.18.3 for 4.18.x) immediately. If an upgrade is not possible, validate property names in the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map with the regex ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ and filter Camel* headers on consumers.
Original NVD description (English source)
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in Apache Camel Neo4J component. The camel-neo4j producer builds the Cypher WHERE clause for its match/retrieve and delete operations from the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map. CVE-2025-66169 addressed Cypher injection through the property values by binding them as query parameters ($paramN), but the property names (the JSON keys of that map) were still concatenated into the query string verbatim in Neo4jProducer.retrieveNodes() and deleteNode(). A property name containing Cypher syntax therefore alters the structure of the executed query. Where a route maps untrusted input into the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map - for example by passing a request body as the match map, or from a consumer that does not filter inbound Camel* headers - an attacker who controls the JSON key names can inject arbitrary Cypher and read, modify or delete any node or relationship in the Neo4j database. The CamelNeo4jMatchProperties header is itself Camel-prefixed and is filtered by the HTTP header-filter strategy, so a plain HTTP client cannot set it directly; the issue is reachable through routes that deliberately or inadvertently carry untrusted data into that header. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not populate the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map from untrusted input: validate or allow-list the property names (for example against ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$) before the Neo4j producer, and ensure that any consumer feeding such a route filters inbound Camel* / camel* headers so the match header cannot be supplied by an external sender.