CVE-2026-33318
HighCVSS 8.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk41th percentile - higher than 41% of all known CVEs
Summary
In Actual (a personal finance tool) prior to version 26.4.0, an authenticated user (including BASIC role) can escalate to ADMIN on servers migrated from password authentication to OpenID Connect. The flaw combines missing authorization on POST /account/change-password, an orphaned password row left after migration, and a client-supplied loginMethod that bypasses active auth configuration. All three weaknesses must be chained sequentially to achieve privilege escalation.
Risk Assessment
An attacker with a basic account can gain full administrative control over the instance, leading to compromise of financial data and configuration. The risk is especially relevant for environments that migrated from passwords to OIDC.
Recommendation
Upgrade Actual to version 26.4.0 or later, which contains the fix. Until then, restrict access to trusted users and monitor for unusual privilege changes.
Other vulnerabilities in Actual
See all- CVE-2026-57449High
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
- CVE-2026-50179Medium
In Actual prior to 26.6.0, CSV export functions do not neutralize formula prefixes, allowing injection of malicious formulas (e.g., starting with =, +, -) into CSV files. When opened in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets, these formulas execute, enabling transaction data exfiltration and manipulation of displayed values.
- CVE-2026-49229High
In Actual app in OpenID multi-user mode, disabling a user only blocks future OpenID login, but existing session tokens remain valid. The session validation does not check if the user is still enabled, allowing a disabled user to continue accessing authenticated endpoints.
- CVE-2026-50007High
In Actual up to 26.7.0, a missing authorization issue allows a shared user with user_access on a budget file to perform owner-only file management actions. A non-owner shared user can call endpoints like /delete-user-file, /reset-user-file, and /user-create-key because requireFileAccess treats ordinary shared access as sufficient for these operations.
Original NVD description (English source)
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.4.0, any authenticated user (including `BASIC` role) can escalate to `ADMIN` on servers migrated from password authentication to OpenID Connect. Three weaknesses combine: `POST /account/change-password` has no authorization check, allowing any session to overwrite the password hash; the inactive password `auth` row is never removed on migration; and the login endpoint accepts a client-supplied `loginMethod` that bypasses the server's active auth configuration. Together these allow an attacker to set a known password and authenticate as the anonymous admin account created during the multiuser migration. The three weaknesses form a single, sequential exploit chain — none produces privilege escalation on its own. Missing authorization on POST /change-password allows overwriting a password hash, but only matters if there is an orphaned row to target. Orphaned password row persisting after migration provides the target row, but is harmless without the ability to authenticate using it. Client-controlled loginMethod: "password" allows forcing password-based auth, but is useless without a known hash established by step 1. All three must be chained in sequence to achieve the impact. No single weakness independently results in privilege escalation. The single root cause is the missing authorization check on /change-password; the other two are preconditions that make it exploitable. Version 26.4.0 contains a fix.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS