CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-31709

HighCVSS 8.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.26%

17th percentile - higher than 17% of all known CVEs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, a vulnerability was found in the CIFS implementation where build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() improperly validate the DACL structure from the server. A malicious server can supply a truncated DACL with a fake ACE count, causing an out-of-bounds read during security descriptor rewrite.

Risk Assessment

An attacker-controlled SMB server can exploit this to read kernel memory or potentially escalate privileges on the client system, compromising data confidentiality and integrity.

Recommendation

Immediately update the Linux kernel to a version containing the fix (commit adding validate_dacl()), which enforces full DACL structural validation before rewriting.

Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor. The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body. A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs. Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS