CVE-2026-31217
CriticalSummary
The _load_model() function in the neural_magic_training.py script of the optimate project allows arbitrary code execution. A user can supply a directory path via the --model command-line argument, which allows reading and executing the module.py file from that directory without validating its content.
Risk Assessment
An attacker controlling the input directory can execute arbitrary Python code in the context of the process running the script, posing a serious security risk to the system.
Recommendation
It is recommended to implement validation and sanitization of the file content before execution to prevent unauthorized code execution.
Other vulnerabilities in neural_magic_training.py
See all- CVE-2026-31219High
The _load_model() function in the neural_magic_training.py script of the optimate project is vulnerable to insecure deserialization. This allows a malicious attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system by providing a crafted model file.
- CVE-2026-31218High
The _load_model() function in the neural_magic_training.py script of the optimate project is vulnerable to insecure deserialization. The lack of enabling the weights_only=True security parameter when loading the state_dict.pt file allows for the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
Original NVD description (English source)
The _load_model() function in the neural_magic_training.py script of the optimate project in commit a6d302f912b481c94370811af6b11402f51d377f (2024-07-21) allows arbitrary code execution. When a user supplies a directory path via the --model command-line argument, the function reads a module.py file from that directory and executes its contents directly using Python's exec() function. This design does not validate or sanitize the file's content, allowing an attacker who controls the input directory to execute arbitrary Python code in the context of the process running the script.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS