CVE-2026-30959

OneUptime is an open-source monitoring platform. Prior to version 10.0.42, the Worker service exposes workflow execution endpoints without authentication. An attacker who knows a workflow ID can execute arbitrary workflows with controlled input, enabling JavaScript code execution, notification abuse, and data manipulation.

OneUptime prior to version 10.0.42 allows unauthenticated access to Notification test and Phone Number management endpoints, enabling SMS/Call/Email/WhatsApp abuse and phone number purchase.

OneUptime's webhook target check rejects private and loopback addresses given in IPv4 form and a small set of IPv6 forms, but has no case for the IPv4-mapped IPv6 range. The webhook delivery path calls SSRFProtection.validateWebhookTargetIsSafe, and the host-literal screening inside Common/Server/Utils/SSRFProtection.ts, performed by isBlockedHostnameLiteral, rejects private and loopback IPv4 ranges and tests an IPv6 value against the unspecified address, the loopback, the link-local prefix and the unique-local prefixes. A value such as [::ffff:127.0.0.1] matches none of them. The value is also recognised as an address literal rather than a name, so the path that re-checks addresses obtained from resolution is not taken. The HTTP client treats the mapped form as the embedded IPv4 address and connects to it, so an authenticated project member who can configure a webhook can direct the server at loopback services, private network ranges and link-local metadata endpoints, and the response is recorded where the webhook result can be read. Version 12.0.7 adds handling for the mapped range.

In OneUptime prior to version 10.0.42, the SAML SSO implementation decouples signature verification from identity extraction. An attacker can prepend an unsigned assertion with an arbitrary identity before a legitimately signed one, leading to authentication bypass.

OneUptime before version 10.0.42 registers multiple notification API endpoints without authentication middleware, while sibling endpoints use it. Combined with a projectId leak from the public Status Page API, an unauthenticated attacker can purchase phone numbers on the victim's Twilio account and delete existing alerting numbers.

OneUptime prior to 10.0.24 logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user.