CVE-2026-23747
LowCVSS 3.7Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk22th percentile - higher than 22% of all known CVEs
Summary
In Golioth Firmware SDK versions 0.10.0 through 0.22.0 (before commit 48f521b), a stack-based buffer overflow exists in Payload Utils. The golioth_payload_as_int() and golioth_payload_as_float() helpers copy network-supplied payload data into fixed-size stack buffers using memcpy() with a length derived from payload_size, with length checks only guarded by assert() which are compiled out in release builds. Payloads larger than 12 bytes (int) or 32 bytes (float) can overflow the stack, causing a crash/denial of service.
Risk Assessment
An attacker (server or MITM) can send a malicious payload to LightDB State, causing a stack overflow and device crash, leading to disruption of IoT system operations.
Recommendation
Immediately update Golioth Firmware SDK to version 0.22.0 or later, which includes the fix in commit 48f521b. If updating is not possible, limit trust in servers and implement additional data validation mechanisms.
Other vulnerabilities in Golioth Firmware SDK
See all- CVE-2026-23749Low
In Golioth Firmware SDK versions 0.19.1 through 0.21.0, there is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability due to improper null termination of a blockwise transfer path. The blockwise_transfer_init() function copies the path using strncpy() without guaranteeing a trailing NUL byte, leaving the buffer unterminated. A subsequent strlen() call on this buffer can read past the allocated memory, causing a crash or denial of service.
- CVE-2026-23748Low
In Golioth Firmware SDK versions 0.10.0 through 0.22.0, there is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in LightDB State string parsing. When payload_size is less than 2, a size_t underflow occurs when computing the number of bytes to copy, and the subsequent memcpy() reads past the end of the network buffer, potentially crashing the device.
Original NVD description (English source)
Golioth Firmware SDK version 0.10.0 prior to 0.22.0, fixed in commit 48f521b, contain a stack-based buffer overflow in Payload Utils. The golioth_payload_as_int() and golioth_payload_as_float() helpers copy network-supplied payload data into fixed-size stack buffers using memcpy() with a length derived from payload_size. The only length checks are guarded by assert(); in release builds, the asserts are compiled out and memcpy() may copy an unbounded payload_size. Payloads larger than 12 bytes (int) or 32 bytes (float) can overflow the stack, resulting in a crash/denial of service. This is reachable via LightDB State on_payload with a malicious server or MITM.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS