CVE-2026-22607
HighSummary
Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's cProfile module as unsafe. A malicious pickle using cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
Risk Assessment
Organizations relying on Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization may be tricked into executing attacker-controlled code, leading to system compromise or data breach.
Recommendation
Upgrade Fickling to version 0.1.7 or later. Additionally, consider using extra security measures such as sandboxing when deserializing pickles.
Other vulnerabilities in Fickling
See all- CVE-2026-22612High
Fickling, a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer, before version 0.1.7 contains a vulnerability that allows bypassing detection of malicious code. The issue stems from a lack of analysis of 'builtins' objects and has been fixed in version 0.1.7.
- CVE-2026-22609High
Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Prior to version 0.1.7, the unsafe_imports() method in Fickling's static analyzer fails to flag several high-risk Python modules that can be used for arbitrary code execution. Malicious pickles importing these modules will not be detected as unsafe, allowing attackers to bypass Fickling's primary static safety checks.
- CVE-2026-22608High
Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Prior to version 0.1.7, it did not explicitly block the ctypes and pydoc modules, which combined with pydoc.locate can achieve RCE while the scanner still reports the file as LIKELY_SAFE. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.
- CVE-2026-22606High
Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's runpy module as unsafe. A malicious pickle using runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. This can lead to arbitrary code execution if users rely on Fickling's output for deserialization safety.
- CVE-2026-14535High
In fickling up to version 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass registers shortened code for every import in a shared set, causing the subsequent MLAllowlist pass to skip all checks as already reported. This renders MLAllowlist dead code, allowing imports of modules outside the allowlist (e.g., torch, numpy) to be missed, leading to a false LIKELY_SAFE verdict.
- CVE-2026-14534High
The vulnerability in fickling up to version 0.1.10 is due to missing Python standard library modules (_posixsubprocess, site, atexit) in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist. This causes check_safety() to incorrectly mark malicious pickle payloads as LIKELY_SAFE, allowing deserialization and execution of dangerous functions like fork_exec, execsitecustomize, or _run_exitfuncs.
Original NVD description (English source)
Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's cProfile module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.