CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-19741

HighCVSS 7.5
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.26%

18th percentile - higher than 18% of all known CVEs

Summary

Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with the default "J01NME", a publicly known example Joining Device Credential from OpenThread and Thread documentation. Firmware built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y without overriding the PSKd shipped with this public credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. An attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device can complete the DTLS-PSK handshake and supply an attacker-controlled operational dataset.

Risk Assessment

An attacker within radio range can become the device's router, viewing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all its IPv6 traffic and impersonating expected peers, while cutting the device off from its intended network. The device stays mis-provisioned until reset, and only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives.

Recommendation

Do not rely on the default PSKd — provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application. Update to a version with the fix that removes the default and adds a BUILD_ASSERT requiring a 6-to-32-character PSKd.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset. The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination. The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS