CVE-2026-19740
MediumCVSS 6.5Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk1th percentile - higher than 1% of all known CVEs
Summary
The LLCP implementation in Zephyr's Bluetooth LE Controller retains a receive node after accepting LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND, but invalid-PDU paths fail to release it before completing the procedure. An attacker can send a PDU sequence causing an assertion failure (device crash) or leaking nodes from the receive pool, leading to Bluetooth unavailability until reboot.
Risk Assessment
The risk is device crash or exhaustion of the controller receive pool, making Bluetooth inoperable. The attack requires no pairing or encryption and can be repeated, causing persistent denial of service until reboot.
Recommendation
Apply the fix from the associated pull request that releases the retained node in invalid-PDU paths. If updating is not possible, consider disabling debug assertions (CONFIG_BT_ASSERT) or increasing CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS to mitigate impact.
Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr
See all- CVE-2026-19673High
A vulnerability in ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c in the Zephyr network stack. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the received frame buffer is reinterpreted as an 18-byte net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length, causing an out-of-bounds read and raising hdr_len to 18. A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers the issue.
- CVE-2026-10772Unknown
This CVE has been rejected as a duplicate. The described vulnerability involved incorrect permission checking in the Bluetooth GATT notify/indicate paths in the Zephyr stack, but was already reported as CVE-2026-2411.
- CVE-2026-10676Unknown
CVE-2026-10676 has been withdrawn as analysis determined that the reported defect is not reachable in any released version of Zephyr. In every supported release, the affected value is corrected before use.
- CVE-2026-5067Critical
Zephyr OS has a memory corruption vulnerability in the HTTP server WebSocket upgrade path. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger it by sending a crafted Sec-WebSocket-Key header. The bounded copy does not guarantee NUL termination, leading to out-of-bounds read/write on stack.
- CVE-2026-19935High
A vulnerability in the Zephyr Bluetooth LE stack allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to trigger a use-after-free in L2CAP CoC channel handling with dynamic PSMs. By sending a data frame followed by a disconnect request, the attacker can cause the system workqueue to process work referencing a freed channel, leading to memory corruption or workqueue corruption.
- CVE-2026-19669High
A vulnerability in Zephyr's syscall verifiers z_vrfy_fuel_gauge_get_props() and z_vrfy_fuel_gauge_set_props() allocates variable-length arrays on the kernel stack sized directly by an unvalidated caller-supplied len argument. Because no bounds check occurs before allocation and copying, a user-mode thread (with CONFIG_USERSPACE) can trigger an out-of-bounds write in supervisor mode with attacker-controlled length and, on the permitted path, attacker-controlled content.
- CVE-2026-19577High
An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in the IPv6 subsystem of the Zephyr stack in net_route_ipv6_packet(). The issue stems from missing validation of whether a neighbor cache entry has a link-layer address before using it. An attacker on the same link can force an unresolved neighbor state and trigger an out-of-bounds read past the address array, potentially causing a system panic or data leak.
- CVE-2026-19186High
In the IEEE 802.15.4 stack in Zephyr, the function ieee802154_decipher_data_frame() does not check if the frame is long enough before computing the payload length. Subtracting the header and authentication tag length from the frame length can underflow, leading to an out-of-bounds read and write. An attacker within radio range can send a short frame, causing memory corruption and system crash.
- CVE-2026-18415Medium
The ieee802154_send() function in Zephyr's network stack copies an outgoing packet into a fixed 125-byte transmit buffer without validating its length. When 6LoWPAN fragmentation is enabled but not required, the missing size check allows an out-of-bounds write past the buffer. The flaw is reachable through NET_AF_PACKET sockets bound to an 802.15.4 interface, including from an unprivileged application thread in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds.
- CVE-2026-15890Medium
A vulnerability in the PSA Internal Trusted Storage module in Zephyr involves a lack of synchronization in nonce generation for AEAD encryption. The function secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() uses unsynchronized function-local static variables, and concurrent writes to the same UID can lead to nonce reuse with the same key. This causes a catastrophic AEAD failure, enabling data leakage and forgery of stored entries.
Original NVD description (English source)
The Link Layer Control Procedure (LLCP) implementation of the Zephyr software Bluetooth LE Controller retains the receive node that carried an accepted LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND so that it can later be reused for the host notification when the update instant is reached (llcp_rx_node_retain() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp.c, and the node is deliberately not recycled while marked NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN). The invalid-PDU arms of llcp_lp_pu_rx() and llcp_rp_pu_rx() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_phy.c completed the procedure via llcp_lr_complete() / llcp_rr_complete() without first releasing that retained node, so the procedure context — the only remaining reference to the node — was freed while the node was still held out of the receive pool. A peer device on an established LE connection can drive this deterministically and without pairing or encryption. Against a peripheral it sends LL_PHY_REQ, receives LL_PHY_RSP, sends a valid LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (so the node becomes retained), and then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ; ull_cp_rx() routes it to the active remote PHY Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The mirror case applies to a locally initiated PHY Update followed by an LL_REJECT_IND. In the default configuration (CONFIG_BT_ASSERT and CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG both default y) the violated invariant in llcp_lr_check_done() / llcp_rr_check_done() triggers a controller assertion, ending in k_oops() (or k_panic()) — a single crafted PDU sequence from radio range faults the device. With those assertions compiled out, each attempt silently leaks one receive PDU node and its memq link; because the controller receive pool is small (PDU_RX_CNT, driven by CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1) and each attempt costs the attacker only a reconnect, a few repetitions exhaust the pool and leave Bluetooth inoperable until reboot. On releases v3.4.0 through v3.7.x the assertion is never reached, whatever the configuration, so every attempt leaks silently. The impact is limited to availability: the orphaned node leaves no dangling pointer that is later dereferenced and is never delivered to the host, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. The same pull request applies the identical release to the Connection Update and CIS-create procedures, whose invalid-PDU arms had the same omission.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

