CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-19673

HighCVSS 7.1
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability in ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c in the Zephyr network stack. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the received frame buffer is reinterpreted as an 18-byte net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length, causing an out-of-bounds read and raising hdr_len to 18. A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers the issue.

Risk Assessment

In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment, resulting in a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential. With assertions enabled, the node panics.

Recommendation

Update the Zephyr network stack to a version containing the fix that rejects the frame before the tag is read and validates hdr_len (14 or 18) against pkt->buffer->len. Until the fix is deployed, consider disabling CONFIG_NET_VLAN on receiving interfaces or restricting frame acceptance through the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt->buffer->len, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds. A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the "frame is for me" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data(). With assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential. Only configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt->buffer->len.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS