CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-19185

HighCVSS 7.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.11%

1th percentile - higher than 1% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability was found in the system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in Zephyr RTOS, which fails to validate per-target data pointers in the i3c_ccc_payload structure. The verifier also operates on the caller's live structure, allowing another thread to modify fields between check and use. This allows an unprivileged thread to write to arbitrary kernel addresses (via read CCC) or disclose kernel memory (via write CCC), leading to privilege escalation.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability allows an unprivileged user thread to write to arbitrary kernel memory and disclose kernel memory, potentially leading to full system compromise and bypass of CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation.

Recommendation

Update Zephyr RTOS immediately to a version containing the fix (introducing copy_ccc_and_do()), which snapshots the payload and validates all target buffers. If updating is not possible, restrict access to the I3C controller to trusted threads only.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c validated the outer struct i3c_ccc_payload, the broadcast ccc.data buffer and the targets.payloads[] array, but did not validate the per-target data buffers those array elements point at. Each struct i3c_ccc_target_payload carries its own data pointer and data_len, and neither was passed through K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() before the payload was handed to z_impl_i3c_do_ccc() and on to the controller driver. The verifier also operated on the caller's live structure rather than a snapshot, so validated fields could be changed by a second user thread between the check and the driver's use — unlike the sibling z_vrfy_i3c_transfer(), which has always copied its message array first. The defect is only present in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, where drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c is compiled. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the I3C controller device object — the ordinary way an application lets a user thread talk to I3C peripherals — can issue a direct CCC whose target payload data pointer names an arbitrary kernel address. Controller drivers dereference that pointer directly (for example drivers/i3c/i3c_mcux.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_cdns.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_stm32.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_npcx.c), using rnw to decide direction. A read CCC therefore causes the kernel-mode driver to write bus-received bytes into an attacker-chosen kernel address for an attacker-chosen length, and a write CCC transmits kernel memory out onto the I3C bus. The result is an out-of-bounds kernel write plus a kernel memory disclosure, i.e. escalation from a user-mode thread to supervisor privilege, defeating the isolation CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide. The fix introduces copy_ccc_and_do(), which snapshots the payload, copies the target array into kernel memory with k_usermode_alloc_from_copy() (bounding num_targets to fewer than 32), validates each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to rnw, and copies the driver-written num_xfer and err fields back to the caller.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS