CVE-2026-18438
HighCVSS 8.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Elevated risk60th percentile - higher than 60% of all known CVEs
Summary
The Templately plugin for WordPress (up to and including version 3.7.1) contains a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the fetch_remote_file function. The issue stems from a filename validation/destination mismatch — file type is validated against the Content-Disposition header, while the actual write path is derived from the URL, allowing a file with a .php extension to be written. An attacker with contributor-level access can bypass the unfiltered_upload capability gate and execute code on the server.
Risk Assessment
The risk to the organization is critical — an attacker with a low-privileged account (contributor) can take over the server, execute arbitrary code, and overwrite the global Templately cloud connection. This can lead to full site compromise, data theft, or use of the server for further attacks.
Recommendation
Immediately update the Templately plugin to the latest patched version. Additionally, until the update is applied, restrict access for low-privileged accounts (contributor) and block access to the REST endpoints /templately/v1/clouds/upload, /templately/v1/insert, and /templately/v1/login for unauthorized users.
Original NVD description (English source)
The Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.